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CHAPTER
The middle-income trap and upgrading 
along global value chains
JAKOB ENGEL AND DARIA TAGLIONI
After acting as the primary drivers of global growth in the years immediately following the 2007–08 global financial crisis, emerging and developing economies experienced a substantial decline. Having exceeded 
4% a year from 2010 to 2014, their growth declined to 3.4% in 
2015 and to an expected 3.5% in 2016, with commodity produc-
ers projected to grow only 0.4% in 2016 (figure 5.1; World Bank 
2016a). The end of the commodity boom and concerns about 
financial stability in many emerging economies led Haldane 
(2015, p. 13) to argue that after the Anglo-Saxon crisis of 2008/09 
and the euro-area crisis of 2011/12, “we may now be entering 
the early stages of Part Three of the [crisis] trilogy, the ‘Emerging 
Market’ crisis of 2015 onwards.” Many emerging economies face 
high corporate debt and excess capacity, leaving them vulner-
able to unexpected domestic or global events (IMF 2016). And 
many of the world’s largest middle-income countries — including 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Nigeria, and the Russian 
Federation — have seen substantial slowdowns.1 In this economic 
climate, gaining better understanding of different growth trajec-
tories and the obstacles middle-income countries face in sustain-
ing rapid growth becomes all the more relevant.
This chapter examines in greater depth the middle-income 
trap — in which high sustained growth becomes increasingly dif-
ficult once a country reaches GDP per capita of around $10,000. 
The term, coined by Gill and Kharas (2007) in relation to growth 
prospects in Asia, remains ambiguous and is interpreted in var-
ious ways, producing different empirical findings and policy 
recommendations. Indeed, a trap specific to middle-income 
countries is disputed (see Pritchett and Summers 2014; Im and 
Rosenblatt 2013; Roy and others 2016), and the data tend to 
show substantial upward mobility between 2000 and 2015, par-
ticularly for middle-income countries, with 79 of 133 countries 
that were low or middle income in 2000 improving their income 
status and none declining (table 5.1).
After addressing some of the definitional issues, the chapter 
reviews recent cross-country and case-study literature on the 
middle-income trap — its causes and its possible solutions.
It then links the middle-income trap to the emergence and 
growing significance of trade through global value chains (GVCs). 
The role of GVCs in trade and investment flows dominates aca-
demic and policy debates on trade and industrial development 
(see Gereffi 2014; Taglioni and Winkler 2016). One characteristic 
of GVC trade is the denationalizing of comparative advantage, 
which could allow countries to industrialize by joining GVCs 
rather than by building their own (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 
2015). So integration into GVCs has been widely viewed as a stra-
tegic pillar for developing countries to become more competi-
tive, to develop the skills and human capital of their labor force, 
and to acquire technology to industrialize and move into higher 
value-added production. Whether such economic upgrading is 
happening — and if so, where and how — remains subject to much 
debate and speculation.
This chapter surveys these two debates — on the middle-
income trap phenomenon and on countries’ ability to grow and 
develop through GVC participation — and asks whether integra-
tion into GVCs can help countries avoid a middle-income trap 
and, if so, why and under what circumstances. The primary focus 
is examining how the factors that are hypothesized to contrib-
ute to growth slowdowns at middle income may also impede 
economic upgrading through GVCs. The literature is limited on 
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the relationship between the two debates, but empirical analy-
ses have found some evidence that GVC participation supports 
escape from the dynamics hypothesized in the middle-income 
trap literature, albeit with substantial variation (Kummritz and 
others 2016; Boffa and others 2016). However, this chapter does 
not assign causality; it instead asserts that while GVC integra-
tion can support sustained high growth rates for middle-income 
countries, a certain level of development and industrial com-
plexity also tends to be a prerequisite for participation in more 
sophisticated, higher value-added GVCs.
The chapter makes four central claims:
• The two debates have existed mostly independent of each 
other, but they should be bridged. The factors that constrain 
GVC participation and upgrading provide a more granular 
perspective of tasks, products, and industries — and a more 
coherent and applicable set of policy recommendations 
to address the causes of growth slowdowns and structural 
stagnation.
• The need for developing countries to adapt to trade through 
globally integrated value chains in goods, services, and 
information presents a partial but important conceptual par-
adigm and policy framework to identify levers for middle-
income countries to converge with richer countries. The eco-
nomic complexity and institutional sophistication required 
to upgrade into higher value-added tasks and products over 
time — in the context of the emergence of globally integrated 
lead firms — are lacking in many middle-income countries.
• The institutional, macroeconomic, trade, and industrial policies 
required for successful GVC participation can also address eco-
nomic stagnation among trapped middle-income countries.
FIGURE 5.1 GDP per capita growth, by income group, 2006–15
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Source: World Development Indicators database.
TABLE 5.1 Share of all countries in a given income group in 2000 and 2015
Percent
Income group in 2015
Low  
income
Lower middle 
income
Upper middle 
income
High  
income Total
Income 
group 
in 2000
Low income 47.6 47.6 4.8 0.0 100
Lower middle income 0.0 37.7 58.5 3.8 100
Upper middle income 0.0 0.0 51.4 48.6 100
High income 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100
Total 14 6 24 4 25 8 35 1 100
Source: World Bank County and Lending Group Classification (see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country 
-and-lending-groups).
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• Emerging technological changes are likely to further complicate 
the ability to develop by integrating into and upgrading within 
GVCs unless countries explicitly address the links between pro-
duction and distribution and between economic and social 
change. This informs a broad set of policy recommendations 
that — while requiring more nuanced targeting and adapta-
tion specific to each country and sector — provide a promising 
framework for overcoming difficulties specific to middle-income 
countries in the age of automation and digitization.
The chapter first goes into greater depth on the debates sur-
rounding the middle-income trap and clarifies the main terms. It 
then provides a framework for viewing transitions from low- to 
middle-income status and from middle- to high-income status 
through a GVC lens — and the GVC-related factors that medi-
ate these transitions. It then examines emerging technological 
and economic factors and trends that are likely to make efforts 
to escape the middle-income trap through participation in GVCs 
more complex in the medium term and offers some potential 
policy solutions.
Definitions and implications of the middle-
income trap
The term “middle-income trap” was coined almost a decade ago 
by Gill and Kharas (2007), who discussed three transformations 
that modern growth theory predicted middle-income countries 
in East Asia would experience. First was the slowing and rever-
sal of diversification as countries became more specialized in 
production and employment. Second was the declining impor-
tance of investment and the acceleration of innovation. And third 
was the shift in education systems to equip workers with the 
skills not just to adjust to new technologies, but also to shape 
new products and processes. They noted that many Southeast 
Asian countries stagnated and failed to make the transition to 
productivity-driven growth. While the term middle-income trap 
was novel, the concept was not — drawing on earlier work on low-
level equilibrium traps (Nelson 1956), poverty traps (Leibenstein 
1962; Aazariadis and Drazen 1990; Kraay and Raddatz 2007), and 
globalization’s missing middle (Garrett 2004).
What is the middle-income trap, does it exist, and how 
can it be measured?
A large and growing body of literature focuses on whether the 
term is useful for examining the problems facing industrializing 
countries. As Gill and Kharas (2015) noted, after 10 years and 
more than 300 articles the term remains poorly defined and 
backed by almost no formal modeling, with very few exceptions 
(Agénor and Canuto 2015; Dabús and others 2016). However, two 
dominant definitions of the middle-income trap have emerged. 
At its most basic, the trap is seen as sustained economic stagna-
tion. Egawa (2013, p. 2) argues that it is “a situation in which an 
MIC [middle-income country] falls into economic stagnation and 
becomes unable to advance its economy to a high-income level 
for certain reasons specific to MICs” related to “a delay or failure 
to change the economic structure from an input-driven growth 
model into a productivity-driven growth model.”
Three approaches to assessing when a country is stuck in a 
middle-income trap have emerged: one on absolute conver-
gence to high-income countries, one on relative convergence, 
and one on structural change, going beyond income-related 
measures of development. The approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, and even studies focused on assessing convergence 
dynamics — and in many cases not finding any unique middle-
income country trap — generally acknowledge that specific 
structural changes are required for middle-income countries to 
increase their income.
Absolute convergence. Drawing on Hausmann and others’ (2005) 
definition of growth slowdowns, Eichengreen and others (2013) 
stipulated three conditions for a growth slowdown to be clas-
sified as a middle-income trap: a seven-year average growth 
rate of GDP per capita of at least 3.5% prior to the slowdown, a 
decline in the seven-year average growth rate of GDP per capita 
of at least 2 percentage points, and GDP per capita greater than 
$10,000 in 2005 international purchasing power parity prices. 
They find a bimodal middle-income trap at GDP per capita of 
$10,000–$11,000 and $15,000–$16,000, suggesting that growth 
in middle-income countries slows in two main stages.
Relative convergence. Felipe and others (2012) focused on how 
long it took countries to cross income thresholds and defined a 
lower-middle-income trap as a country failing to attain average 
growth of income per capita of at least 4.7% a year and an upper-
middle income trap as a country failing to attain average growth 
of income per capita of at least 3.5% a year. The relative approach 
is exemplified by Aiyar and others (2013), who regressed growth 
in GDP per capita on lagged income and measures of physical 
and human capital to come up with a predicted growth rate. The 
residuals of this regression are defined as actual growth minus 
estimated growth, and a slowdown takes place when a substan-
tial deviation in actual versus expected growth is sustained over 
10 years. Robertson and Ye (2013) likewise used the growth rate 
of income relative to the United States as their dependent vari-
able. Similarly, Huang (2016) defined this process of stagnation as 
an economy’s ability to continue to grow more rapidly than the 
United States after reaching middle-income status. Furthermore, 
not even the World Bank and International Monetary Fund defi-
nition of a middle-income country is considered a helpful bench-
mark by all researchers: Aiyar and others (2013) and Roy and others 
(2016) assigned a country middle-income status if its GDP range 
was 15–50% of U.S. income, depending on the specification.
Structural change. A third approach, while not contradicting the 
relative and absolute convergence approaches, focuses less on 
quantitative measures of growth slowdowns and more on the 
structure of the country’s economy and on processes of trans-
formation. Dingemans (2016, p. 644) defined Chile’s middle-
income trap as the country’s “inability to (incrementally) diversify 
and enhance its export trade.” Ohno (2009, p. 1) argued that the 
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defining characteristic of the middle-income trap is a country’s 
failure “to build a national mindset and institutions that encour-
age constant upgrading of its human capital.” Ohno divided the 
catching-up industrialization process into four stages and iden-
tified a middle-income trap as a glass ceiling in manufacturing 
between stages two and three (figure 5.2). In stages one through 
three foreign direct investment is critical to promote and sus-
tain growth. Ohno found that Viet Nam’s growth in the past two 
decades was driven largely by liberalization and large inflows of 
external purchasing power. Rigg and others (2014) took a more 
sociological approach in their analysis of Thailand and argued 
that a middle-income trap can be assessed by how individuals 
and households negotiate — or do not — the skills/employment 
transition.
Useful? While most researchers find at least some value in the 
concept, Pritchett and Summers (2014) demonstrated empiri-
cally that there has been little continuity in growth performance 
historically and found that growth declines are more likely to be 
sudden and large than gradual and small. Thus, what others may 
perceive as the middle-income trap is more likely to be a regres-
sion to the mean. Im and Rosenblatt (2013, p. 25) rejected the 
middle-income trap concept arguing that “MICs [middle-income 
countries] do not really look that different in terms of transitions 
across the inter-country distribution of income” and display 
growth trajectories that “do not conform to one clear pattern 
that can be easily characterized as a ‘trap.’”
More recently, Roy and others (2016) found little value in the 
middle-income trap as an empirical phenomenon. Using var-
ious measures of convergence based on catching up with rich 
countries either as a group or with the United States and based 
on both the country and individuals as the unit of measurement 
(accounting for and assuming away distributional changes within 
countries), they found that while economic divergence was a 
dominating global phenomenon before the 1980s, there is strong 
evidence for economic convergence globally since. They then 
tested whether middle-income countries were negative outliers 
within an unconditional convergence framework that included 
all countries and only middle- and high-income countries2 — and 
found no evidence for either form of middle-income trap.
What are the main identified causes of middle-income 
traps, and which countries are affected?
The substantial definitional issues and differing empirical results 
complicate the notion of a clearly demarcated middle-income 
trap. Can something unique about industrialization processes 
for present-day middle-income countries be generalized? Here 
there is greater convergence, even among the skeptics. The lit-
erature assessing the causes of the trap differentiate between 
structural causes and policy-related and institutional causes. 
FIGURE 5.2 Ohno’s stages of catch-up industrialization
Stage four
Full capability 
in innovation 
and product 
design as 
global leader
Japan,
United States, 
European Union
Arrival of 
manufacturing 
foreign direct 
investment
Agglomeration
Technology 
absorption
Creativity
Glass ceiling for ASEAN countries 
(middle-income trap)
Stage three
Management 
and technology 
mastered, can 
produce high-
quality goods
Republic
of Korea,
Chinese Taipei
Stage two
Have 
supporting 
industries, but 
still under 
foreign 
guidance
Thailand, 
Malaysia
Stage one
Simple 
manufacturing
under foreign 
guidance
Viet Nam
Stage zero
Monoculture, 
subsistence 
agriculture, 
aid dependency
Source: Ohno 2009.
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Moreover, some researchers distinguish between factors that 
cause the trap and those that perpetuate it (see, for example, 
Toh 2013). However, there is a general consensus that the trap 
reflects a country’s inability to shift its growth strategy and eco-
nomic structure toward sustained high growth rates.
In reviewing the previous decade of debate, Gill and Kharas 
(2015) argued that the middle-income trap occurs when rapidly 
growing countries with rising wages have tried to sustain an 
economy based on labor-intensive manufacturing and export-led 
growth. But as their competitive advantages decline, they have 
been unable to find alternative sources of demand to replace 
exports. This has been exacerbated by the declining elasticity of 
trade to growth in recent years — as well as by rising global com-
petition, increasing currency and balance-sheet risk due to the 
heightened international financial flows, and for some countries, 
a lack of the requisite infrastructure while prematurely attempt-
ing to become knowledge economies.
Differentiating between structural change and convergence 
(whether relative or absolute) has implications from a policy per-
spective. As Paus (2014) noted, even within an income conver-
gence framework there can still be no capability convergence. 
Jankowska and others (2012) explicitly framed this as an issue 
of structural transformation, with Latin America unable to com-
pensate for the decreasing labor share in agriculture through its 
manufacturing sector, but with the Asian newly industrializing 
countries developing modern sectors in which productivity is 
both higher than in the traditional sector and sufficiently labor-
intensive to transmit the gains to a sizable share of the labor 
force.
Glawe and Wagner (2016) pointed to two primary theoret-
ical arguments to explain the trap. The first draws on Arthur 
Lewis’s dual-sector model of the economy and sees the trap as 
reflecting a country’s inability to continue boosting productivity 
by shifting workers from agriculture to industry. The latter argu-
ment, derived mostly from more recent developments in growth 
theory, focuses on a country’s ability (or lack thereof) to imitate 
foreign technologies and develop comparative advantages 
in new export products. Agénor and Canuto (2015), in broad 
strokes, attempted to model and extend this line of thinking, 
arguing that knowledge network effects to developing advanced 
skills and infrastructure allow countries to evade a lower-growth 
equilibrium that they see as equivalent to the middle-income 
trap.
Several studies using absolute and relative convergence defi-
nitions have determined the impact of variables that either are 
correlated with or causally contribute to the trap:
• Eichengreen and others (2013) used a sample of present-day 
developed countries and found that correlates and determi-
nants of growth slowdowns were more likely in economies 
with high old-age dependency ratios, high investment rates, 
and undervalued real exchange rates.
• Aiyar and others (2013) examined 42 variables in seven cate-
gories using a weighted average least-squares approach and 
found the following to be significant determinants of falling 
into the trap: rule of law, size of government, the regulatory 
environment, dependency and sex ratios, the share of gross 
capital inflows, investment public debt in GDP, output diver-
sification, agriculture and service shares, a country’s GDP-
weighted distance, its degree of output diversification, 
whether it is involved in a war or civil conflict, and whether it 
has a tropical climate.
• Bulman and others (2014) used pooled regressions on middle-
income countries and found that escapees from the trap had 
higher growth at all relative incomes, higher total factor pro-
ductivity growth, faster transformations toward industry, 
better macroeconomic management, and consistently more 
export orientation. Furthermore, countries with high second-
ary and tertiary education and with a larger share of high-tech 
products in exports are less likely to fall into the trap.
The results, while methodologically distinctive and using dif-
fering control variables, provide some consistency in their focus 
on demography, equity, the macroeconomic framework, and — 
most prominently — the export structure. In other words there is 
some consensus that factors seen as important for long-run eco-
nomic development are important for middle-income countries 
to sustain GDP growth. This is a useful contribution, but as Paus 
(2014, p. 25) noted, “it is not clear what these findings mean for 
policymaking.”
Trade and export diversification is central to numerous recent 
analyses. Felipe and others (2012) compared the export struc-
ture of countries in the trap across variables related to their abil-
ity to structurally transform and found that escapees had more 
sophisticated and diversified export baskets than did nonescap-
ees. This is also supported by country case studies. Dingemans 
(2016) found that the lack of diversification in Chile was caused 
in large part by the country’s inability to promote innovation and 
develop more complex export products. Paus (2014) likewise saw 
the main challenge for Latin America as addressing the disjunc-
ture between global competitive pressures and the slow process 
for firms to learn and countries to implement capability-enhanc-
ing policies. Rigg and others (2014) identified the primary failure 
of inadequate structural transformation at three distinct levels 
in Thailand: government’s inability to develop the population’s 
human capital, firms’ failure to develop human capital or exploit 
what already exists, and individuals’ unwillingness to develop 
human capital and embrace opportunities away from their home 
villages. The trap is “as much personal as it is structural and insti-
tutional” (p. 196).
Several researches have focused on social and demographic 
factors. Egawa (2013) saw the worsening income distribution 
as a primary engine of stagnation, while Ozturk (2016) empha-
sized the presence and size of the middle class. Panther and 
Flechtner (2015) took the relevance of inequality a step further 
by examining domestic and international inequality as political 
economy drivers of the trap, using a large sample of compar-
ative qualitative case analyses. For national inequality multiple 
intersecting inequalities (income, ownership of assets, access 
to power) result in low institutional quality, which in turn pre-
vents the adoption of policies that may be opposed by vested 
interests and would allow the country to transition to a more 
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productive economy. For international inequality the ability of 
countries to benefit from globalization and the proliferation of 
multinational corporations and GVCs are influenced by distribu-
tions of power and income at the global level. Ito (2016) made 
this focus on institutions as the mediating factor for countries 
either escaping or stuck in the trap more explicit by arguing 
that countries sort themselves into three equilibria (low income, 
middle-income trap, and middle-income convergence toward 
high income), depending on their willingness to carry out fun-
damental economic and structural reforms. Much recent work 
deals either explicitly (Woo 2012; Huang 2016) or implicitly with 
China (World Bank 2013; Pritchett and Summers 2014). In most 
of these China-focused analyses governance and institutions are 
particularly relevant.
Both the definitions and the causes inform the classifica-
tion of countries in the middle-income trap. Some researchers 
focus on individual countries — Egawa (2013) on Malaysia, China, 
and Thailand, Dingemans (2016) on Chile, and Ohno (2009) on 
Malaysia and Thailand. Other researchers take a multicountry 
approach and come to different conclusions. For example, Felipe 
and others (2012) considered 35 of 52 countries to be stuck in 
the trap. Aiyar and others (2013) used a “trap map” based on 
the seven factors and 42 variables to determine countries most 
at risk. Panther and Flechtner (2015) examined which countries 
have achieved convergence with the United States over discreet 
eight- to-nine-year time periods.
Annex 5.1 illustrates the results of the three cross-country 
studies that address different points in time. Aiyar and others 
(2013) examined whether countries risk falling into the middle-
income trap in the future. Felipe and others (2012) analyzed 
countries now in the trap. Panther and Flechtner (2015) assessed 
whether countries that were middle-income countries at some 
point in the past 40 years have managed to converge toward the 
average GDP per capita in high-income countries over discreet 
nine-year periods. So definitively stating which countries are now 
in the middle-income trap is an imprecise science.
How can countries escape from the trap?
The broad array of causes for countries entering and becoming 
stuck in an alleged middle-income trap include macroeconomic 
and microeconomic factors related to industrial structure, trade 
profile, demographics, income distribution, macroeconomic 
management, and the quality of institutions. So how have coun-
tries in the past escaped from middle-income status? And what 
lessons might this hold for countries today? In absolute terms 
many if not all of today’s high-income countries were arguably 
stuck in some sort of middle-income trap in the 20th century 
(table 5.2; Im and Rosenblatt 2013).
It is clear by the objective criteria for escaping the middle-
income trap (graduating from middle-income country status) that 
numerous countries, particularly in East Asia and Central and 
Eastern Europe, have escaped whatever trap dynamics middle-
income status might entail. Bulman and others (2014) described 
this process as part of a momentum hypothesis, where past 
escapees achieved strong growth in one period, followed by 
strong growth in the subsequent period. But Im and Rosenblatt 
(2013, p. 25) are cautious about this inevitability approach, argu-
ing that attempts to grow at rates higher than 7% could lead to 
“unsustainable polices that eventually create the ‘trap’-like pat-
tern of dismal growth that MICs [middle-income countries] are 
trying to avoid in the first place.” So gradualism that focuses on 
overcoming the institutional factors inhibiting growth might be 
more promising. Roy and others’ (2016) analysis of the structural 
break in the 1980s when convergence started attributed this to 
the sharper focus on macroeconomic stability in the 1990s and 
on the transformational changes that the spread of information 
and communication technologies engendered in developed 
economies.
TABLE 5.2 Countries that have escaped the middle-income trap
Reference Definition of escape from middle-income trap Countries that have escaped
Agénor and Canuto 
(2015)
Middle-income countries in the 1960s that became 
high-income countries by 2008
Equatorial Guinea; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Ireland; Israel; Japan; 
Republic of Korea; Mauritius; Portugal; Puerto Rico; Singapore; 
Spain; and Chinese Taipei
Bulman and others 
(2014)
Middle-income countries in 1960 that became high-
income countries by 2009
Greece; Hong Kong, China; Ireland; Japan; Republic of Korea; 
Puerto Rico; Seychelles; Singapore; Spain; and Chinese Taipei. 
Cyprus and Portugal, still classified as middle income in 2009, are 
considered on the verge of escaping
Felipe and others 
(2012)
Crossing from lower-middle-income status in at 
most 28 years and from upper-middle-income status 
in at most 14 years.
No clear list of past escapees, but at their current pace China, 
Bulgaria, Poland, and Thailand should be able to escape the upper-
middle-income trap if they sustain their income per capita growth
Im and Rosenblatt 
(2013)
Middle-income countries in 1950 that have since 
become high-income countries (though the authors 
reject the concept of a middle-income trap)
Austria; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; 
Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; Singapore; Slovenia; 
Spain; and Chinese Taipei
Jankowska and others 
(2012)
Countries that have attained income convergence 
with high-income countries
Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Chinese 
Taipei
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The experiences of these countries center policy recommen-
dations primarily on structural, industrial, and trade policies as 
well as social policy:
• Macroprudential policies limit the buildup of excessive capital 
inflows to cushion impacts of potential sudden stops. How-
ever, Aiyar and others (2013) see an important role for mea-
sures to enhance regional integration, infrastructure invest-
ments, and deregulation in areas where private sector activity 
is excessively stifled. Their threat map aims to provide an ana-
lytical tool to assess where these issues may be at play (see 
table A5.1.1 in annex 5.1).
• Developing knowledge network externalities could link indi-
viduals’ skill attainment and access to public infrastructure 
(Agénor and Canuto 2015).
• Skilled workers are needed to move up the value chain from 
low value-added industries to develop higher value-added 
activities (Eichengreen and others 2013).
• To avoid the middle-income trap, China, like past escapees, 
will need to upgrade its industrial structure through new 
industries with higher levels of technology (Huang 2016). This 
will require differentiating between state-owned enterprises 
and non-state-owned enterprises and between product and 
factor markets.
Jankowska and others (2012) compared the experience of Latin 
American countries with the Asian newly industrialized countries 
using a product-space methodology and suggested that diversi-
fying to new products is central to emulating the experience of 
the newly industrialized countries (figure 5.3). In these countries 
new production was sequentially developed in industries such as 
iron, steel, machinery, and electronics through workers with skills 
and capabilities transferable from existing industries. A central 
lesson from these past industrialization processes is learning how 
to produce and export more complex products — a finding that 
also emerges from the complex systems analysis literature.3
Ohno (2009) proposed that Viet Nam develop a proactive 
industrial policy to internalize skills and technology, develop 
effective public–private partnerships, and deepen industrial 
knowledge. Focusing primarily on structural characteristics 
related to trade, industry, and labor market transformations, 
Felipe and others (2012) argued that the most direct strategy for 
a middle-income country to become a high-income country is to 
acquire a revealed comparative advantage in sophisticated and 
well-connected products. The focus on linking education to (pri-
marily horizontal) industrial development objectives is a logical 
corollary for numerous researchers. Pantner and Flechtner (2015) 
pointed to mobilizing talent through education and providing 
this talent with the right incentives to assimilate best-practice 
technologies and organizational routines to adapt and apply 
them to cutting-edge technologies. Rigg and others (2014) 
linked this more explicitly to countries moving up the value chain 
through re-training and re-skilling and sustained investments in 
upper secondary and tertiary education.
Researchers that focus on the role of inequality in driving trap-
like dynamics for middle-income countries see addressing dispar-
ities as the central component. Egawa (2013) argued that policies 
need to address urban–rural disparities, providing benefits for 
low-income individuals, fiscal redistributive reforms, transfers, 
as well as equalizing education opportunities. Kahras and Kohli 
(2011) see social programs and a change in the policymaking 
mindset that targets the middle class as essential to avoiding the 
FIGURE 5.3 Product space maps of Peru and the Republic of Korea in 2009
Peru Republic of Korea
Source: Jankowska and others 2012.
Note: The product space methodology provides a map of all traded goods displaying relative proximity or similarity between products. The colors on the map 
represent the Leamer classification, which categorizes products according to labor, capital, and other resource intensiveness. The black squares indicate prod-
ucts in which the country has a revealed comparative advantage.
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middle-income trap. All this helps countries mediate three critical 
transitions — from diversification to specialization in production, 
from physical accumulation of factors to productivity-led growth, 
and from centralized to decentralized economic management.
This in turn leads to a focus on institutions. Panther and Flecht-
ner (2015) used a two-level model of the relationship between 
inequality and the middle-income trap to argue that at the inter-
national level ensuring a certain level of domestic equality medi-
ates the benefits of global integration for growth. At the domes-
tic level a focus on economic (over political) equality is central to 
catch-up policies. At the global level having some independence 
in policy-setting from dominant external powers is essential for 
convergence when paired with export diversification. Dinge-
mans (2016) saw the bidirectional relationship between structural 
change and economic development as driven by institutional 
change. Chang (2011) argued that increased wealth intensifies 
the demand for and provision of higher quality institutions and 
new political actors who demand and shape them. In that sense, 
moving from a more state- centered approach to export devel-
opment, not just export promotion, is essential.
Gill and Kharas’s (2015) assessment of 10 years of literature on 
the middle-income trap focused on the need for policymakers to 
manage a transition to more mature institutions so that capital 
investments remain efficient even after growth moves from pro-
ductivity growth stemming from intersectoral resource realloca-
tions to intrasectoral catch-up technological growth.
A new World Bank study (2016b, forthcoming) on Poland’s 
recent high and stable growth sees this as being due in part 
to the country’s institutions transforming in parallel with firms 
increasing in sophistication and complexity — including provid-
ing better foundations for resolving conflict, enforcing contracts, 
and implementing antitrust and competition laws. This has been 
bolstered by rapid integration into the EU bloc, boosting pro-
ductivity through increased trade openness, investment and 
talent, increased domestic competition and regulatory harmoni-
zation, and more certainty through commitments to EU institu-
tions. In comparing new high-income countries (Chile, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, Poland, and the Slovak 
Republic) with trapped middle-income countries (Brazil, Mexico, 
Romania, and Turkey), the study found that while in the late 
1990s these countries were fairly similar in many aspects, by 2015 
barriers to entrepreneurship, trade, and investment were much 
lower in the new high-income countries, which also had lower 
perceived economic and political risk.
The relevance of global value chain trade for 
understanding the middle-income trap
While the role of trade through GVCs remains more implicit 
than explicit in discussions of the middle-income trap, the sig-
nificance of producing and trading higher value-added goods 
is a central lesson from the literature. Establishing this link is the 
focus here. This section first addresses three questions. What is 
meant by GVC participation and upgrading? How is it measured, 
and what factors condition countries’ ability to upgrade in 
GVCs? And what is the empirical relationship between GVC 
participation and the middle-income trap? It then provides a 
conceptual framework for viewing income transitions through a 
firm-level GVC lens.
An overview of global value chain participation and 
economic upgrading
Driven by lower transport, information, and communication costs, 
technological improvements, and lower barriers to the move-
ment of goods and capital, global patterns of trade and produc-
tion have changed dramatically over the past decades. Trade is 
now characterized by the growth and increasing dominance of 
vertically integrated multinational firms with fragmented value 
chains stretching across borders. The internationalization (and 
particularly regionalization) of global production and the devel-
opment of value-chain trade in both goods and services have 
changed the prospects for countries to benefit from trade. In this 
context, understanding a country’s current participation in value 
chains is central to ensuring that its industrial and trade policies 
can facilitate sustainable productivity gains and increased qual-
ity employment in higher value-added sectors. For developing 
countries this creates opportunities to upgrade into new higher 
productivity tasks and activities and to integrate into global 
production networks. But according to some researchers, this 
is often less an issue of catching up than of fitting into existing 
GVCs (Whittaker and others forthcoming).
The value chain concept in the industrial organization litera-
ture (Porter 1985) has become ever more central to understand-
ing and analyzing the interfirm and intrafirm dynamics and gov-
ernance of value-chain trade (Gereffi and others 2005). And in 
trade economics it has increasingly become the dominant frame-
work to understanding the second unbundling of globalization 
(Baldwin 2006; see Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg 2009 and Ahmad 
2013 for overviews of this literature). Viewing trade through a 
GVC framework involves four paradigm shifts for trade policy 
(Catteneo and others 2013):
• It implies a move toward a global (or at least regional) view of 
policy.
• It requires a shift from entire industries to narrower tasks and 
business functions.
• It requires assessing a country’s competitiveness not as 
endowments and stocks but as flows in which GVCs are the 
primary channel enabling transfers.
• It implies a change from focusing on tariffs as the most rele-
vant obstacles to trade to focusing on behind-the-border bar-
riers and regulatory measures.4
Viewing trade this way requires a revised approach to mea-
suring and analyzing cross-border and cross-industry flows, with 
value-added trade becoming a more relevant measure of trade 
flows within GVCs. For individual countries becoming competitive 
in specific components and tasks to participate in globalized pro-
duction networks and in turn generate more value domestically 
over time becomes increasingly important (Taglioni and Winkler 
2016). So using multiregion input- output tables allows for tracking 
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use at the sectoral level and for differentiating between transac-
tions in intermediate and final goods. This has informed a growing 
literature on the development of value added in trade (see Hum-
mels and others 2001, Koopman and others 2014, and Johnson 
and Noguera 2012) and a growing number of indicators and indi-
ces (Fally 2012, Antras and Chor 2013, and Wang and others 2016).
Measuring value-added trade through multiregion input- 
output databases has clear benefits (Ahmad 2013):
• It makes it possible to understand a country’s actual indus-
trial structure and international links among sectors in order 
to formulate targeted policies and strategies.
• It provides evidence of how nontariff measures or regulatory 
changes affect upstream and downstream producers.
• It offers better analytical tools to anticipate the impact of 
potential shocks.
• It enables calculations of the trade’s job content and impact 
on ecosystem services, thanks to satellite accounts of employ-
ment and environmental indicators.
However, multiregion input- output tables have some limita-
tions. They cannot measure the links among service sectors very 
accurately. And they are subject to two simplifying assumptions: 
the proportionality assumption, that all products (for export and 
domestic use) have the same import content, and the homo-
geneity assumption, that the use of inputs is uniform among all 
firms in a sector.
The new data make it possible to quantify economic upgrad-
ing through GVC participation. Drawing on earlier work by Hum-
phrey (2004), Taglioni and Winkler (2016) differentiated four 
types of economic upgrading based on skills, capabilities, and 
comparative advantage. Process upgrading is based on effi-
ciency gains and productivity improvements. Product upgrading 
entails moving into more sophisticated products in an existing 
value chain. Functional upgrading involves increasing the value-
added share by moving toward more sophisticated tasks. And 
intersectoral upgrading involves moving into new value chains 
with higher value-added shares (figure 5.4).
The ability of firms to upgrade is determined by improving 
workers’ skills, improving firms’ absorptive capacity and technol-
ogy, and increasing productivity in existing tasks. Lead firms set 
detailed specifications and requirements that exceed local norms 
and create opportunities for improving capabilities, technolo-
gies, and assets. But this is not always the case: the complexity of 
GVCs and the power dynamics within their governance structures 
can lead to stagnation or downgrading (Rossi 2013; Blažek 2015).
The empirical relationship between global value chain 
integration and the middle-income trap
A broad literature on the factors likely to influence a country’s 
ability to upgrade in GVCs is based primarily on case studies, 
with few econometric analyses (until recently). But open econo-
mies tend to grow faster and have higher incomes than do closed 
economies (Wacziarg and Welch 2008; Gill and Kharas 2015).
GVC participation can lead to higher output, productivity, 
and value added through five main transmission channels: back-
ward and forward links, pro- competitive market restructuring, 
technology spillovers, minimum scale achievements that amplify 
pro- competitive effects, and labor market effects, including the 
demand for skilled workers and their training as well as turn-
over when trained workers move to local firms (figure 5.5).5 The 
individual channels have complex and frequent intermediating 
effects on each other.
Three main factors link value-chain integration to productiv-
ity: foreign direct investment, exporting, and importing inputs 
FIGURE 5.4 Achieving functional, product, and 
intersectoral upgrading through skills, capital, and 
process upgrading
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(Kummritz and others 2016). For foreign direct investment the 
impact of spillovers on productivity is not conclusive (Görg and 
Greenaway 2004, Paus and Gallagher 2008). For the link between 
exporting and economic upgrading, Bernard and Jensen (1999) 
demonstrated that exporters outperform nonexporters in the 
same sector and country in productivity, skills, and wages. Is 
this self-selection or learning by exporting? For self-selection 
the assumption is that only more productive firms are able to 
absorb additional trade costs. The learning by exporting liter-
ature argues that exporting improves the productivity of firms 
over time, with the most robust findings for developing countries 
and nascent industries. Recent research questions the robust-
ness of these early learning by exporting studies (Clerides and 
others 1998), but Lileevea and Treffler (2007) found learning by 
exporting effects for Canada, and Fernandes and Isgut (2005) 
found them for Colombia.
Research on the link between importing inputs and produc-
tivity focuses on developed countries. Importing can improve 
key aspects of competitiveness through three main feedback 
loops: productivity, innovation, and skills. Easier access to 
imports tends to improve firm productivity. Grossman and Rossi- 
Hansberg (2006) showed that offshoring can entail productivity 
gains similar to technological progress for offshoring countries 
through lower input costs. Amiti and Konings (2007) showed that 
a 10% drop in input tariffs leads to a 12% improvement in pro-
ductivity for importing firms. Bas (2012) showed that for a sample 
of Argentinian firms, input tariffs facilitate entry into export mar-
kets. MacGarvie (2006), drawing on French trade and citation 
data, and Bøler and others (2015), using a sample of Norwegian 
firms, found importers to be more innovative and profitable. 
Skills are relevant for importing and complementary to it. Koren 
and  Csillag (2011) showed that importing more sophisticated 
machines requires higher skills to operate them and increases 
the returns to skills.
To test whether GVC participation has enabled countries to 
upgrade economically, Kummritz and others (2016) used foreign 
value added in exports and domestic value added re-exported 
by third countries as respective measures of backward and for-
ward GVC integration and domestic value added generated by 
a specific sector as the measure of economic upgrading. They 
tested the impact of national characteristics that may be associ-
ated with economic upgrading via GVC participation: infrastruc-
ture, connectivity, investment and trade policy, business climate 
and institutions, financial and labor markets, skills and education, 
innovation and product standards, as well as labor, social, and 
environmental standards. They found that overall GVC integra-
tion increases a country’s domestic value added. Splitting the 
sample into income groups did not substantially change results, 
FIGURE 5.5 Transmission channels from global value chain participation to the domestic economy
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though GVC integration as a buyer (through foreign value added) 
is more significant at lower incomes and selling into GVCs has 
more impact at higher incomes. For countries buying from GVCs 
air freight infrastructure and road network quality are particu-
larly important. Connectivity, education and skills, and standards 
compliance are most important for countries selling into GVCs. 
The researchers concluded that the policy areas thought to be 
significant for economic upgrading in GVCs largely have the 
expected impact.
The correlation between GVC integration and GDP per capita 
depends on income status and the type of integration (figure 
5.6; Boffa and others 2016). GVC integration increases GDP per 
capita, but the gains diminish as income increases. Similarly, 
growth in output per capita is highest for lower income groups. 
Some channels for GVC integration depend on industry similar-
ity, with links assumed to be easier when trade is intraindustry. 
Manufacturing leads to higher GDP gains for buyers, but for 
services both types of integration — forward and backward — 
lead to similar GDP increases.
These studies suffer from two main limitations. First, because 
of the lack of value-added trade data prior to 1990, they permit 
analysis for only the last 20 years, while much of the middle- 
income-trap literature goes back 50 years or more. Second, they 
do not specify the conditions for specific types of institutions 
and policies to produce greater gains from GVC participation. 
The next section addresses both limitations in part from a theo-
retical perspective.
Viewing income transitions through a global value chain 
lens: bringing in the firm perspective
The previous section showed that while integrating into GVCs 
is associated with sustained growth and development, doing 
so may become more difficult and complex at higher incomes. 
This section explicitly adopts a GVC firm-level lens to the income 
FIGURE 5.6 Growth of global value chain integration and GDP per capita by income category
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transitions from low to middle to high through a series of dia-
grams laying out these transitions.
Mariscal and Taglioni (2017) proposed a framework that views 
firms’ connection to GVCs as a dynamic process for the rele-
vance of capabilities to evolve in a continuum (figure 5.7). The 
first dimension (x-axis) contains the buying, producing, and sell-
ing aspects of integration in GVCs, and the second dimension 
(y-axis) illustrates the degree of GVC engagement, from proto- 
connecting to connecting to upgrading to mature engagement. 
The orange lines indicate the growing intensity of engagement 
on the buying side, and the blue lines indicate the growing inten-
sity of engagement on the selling side. More sophisticated issues 
tend to appear on the upper section of the diagram, where 
upgrading meets buying, producing, and selling in increasingly 
nuanced and complex ways. Connecting usually starts on the 
buying side: firms that correctly evaluate their core capabilities 
and have an effective sourcing strategy are more likely to suc-
cessfully engage in GVCs. However, the sequence of engage-
ment from simpler to more sophisticated, and from buying to 
selling capabilities, is intended to be illustrative. Rather than 
tightly allocating capabilities into specific steps on the diagram, 
most capabilities are shared between elements. The diagram is 
somewhat selective in reporting the most relevant determinants, 
since they may vary by industry and GVC.
Engagement starts with the proto-connecting stage, when 
reaching a minimum scale of transactions is key in both the 
buying and the selling functions. Intermediaries that play a 
matching role can help firms move the first steps toward inter-
national engagement. The large intermediaries may themselves 
become companies engaging in GVCs, as traders or by gradu-
ally adding value by expanding into processing for some of the 
immediate upstream or downstream functions.
The pure connection stage is mostly about meeting minimum 
requirements — a few basic capabilities that allow the firm to con-
nect to either a foreign market or a lead firm. Basic capabilities 
(such as production or managerial abilities and cheap access to 
key inputs of the production process) and the ability to correctly 
evaluate and leverage the firm’s core competences are crucial in 
connecting to GVCs. From a buying perspective this means that 
the firm can streamline its processes and product scope while 
FIGURE 5.7 How global value chain determinants evolve as the engagement in global value chain changes
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complementing production with proper and effective access to 
input markets. From a selling perspective the key capabilities 
are aligning its goals to those of actual and potential buyers 
and modulating its processes to fit seamlessly in their produc-
tion processes. At this stage engagement in GVCs is not a robust 
situation but is unstable and subject to market forces that may 
exclude the firm from continuing the connection.
Once a firm overcomes the challenges of pure connection, 
its learning processes and absorptive capacities become more 
fundamental — learning by exporting, learning from selling to 
global buyers, and learning to connect decisions on the prod-
uct scope to the available importing possibilities. At this stage 
demand-side elements also acquire importance, as the firm needs 
to make its product known and valued. Efforts will also be made to 
accumulate customers, although competition will be based mostly 
on price rather than quality. As the process continues and deep-
ens, process innovation and product innovation will start to matter 
greatly. Relatedly, firms’ organization of skills will change. Middle 
management will start to become more important than produc-
tion, and the firm will increasingly focus on its core competences 
and learn to spin off tasks that are not its comparative advantage.
In the final stage firms upgrade toward the most complex 
stages of GVC production. Firms are now in direct relation with, 
or themselves become, lead firms, turnkey suppliers, trading 
platforms, or global buyers. The relationships between buyers 
and sellers are seldom the result of market interactions but are 
geared to modular (or even captive) interaction. Firms connect 
to the most technologically relevant buyers with good learning 
potential and virtuous feedback loops through direct and indi-
rect exposure to new ways of managing and organizing produc-
tion. Meanwhile product complexity also increases, with prod-
ucts both more elaborate and containing more value added.
The evolutionary process in GVCs is unlikely to take place in 
a vacuum. As firms transition from proto-connecting to connect-
ing to upgrading to mature engagement, a parallel process of 
development takes place in the hosting economy. The domestic 
economy will likely have evolved to development stages where 
an ecosystem of firms starts building up, populating the middle 
size. The determinants of firm growth will also evolve, increas-
ingly a function of firm capabilities rather than institutional 
idiosyncrasies.
Reflecting their comparative advantages, firms in low-income 
countries will tend to be engaged in GVCs in industries such as 
agriculture and manufacturing, where complexity is limited and 
price competition is more common than nonprice competition 
(table 5.3). In these industries buyer–seller relations tend to be 
either at arm’s length or captive. They are captive when the lead 
firms are technologically very dependent on suppliers, transac-
tions are highly codified, and supplier competence is low. Firm 
size is not a constraint at this stage, so small firms can easily 
engage. Once countries graduate to middle-income status, their 
firms start integrating in GVCs with functions in advanced man-
ufacturing and modern professional services, including prepro-
duction and postproduction high-value added services. In these 
GVCs buyer–seller relations tend to be more relational, captive, 
or hierarchical, with substantial know-how transfers. Participating 
TABLE 5.3 Trajectories in global value chain engagement
Global value chain 
engagement stage Low-income status Middle-income status High-income status
Industry complexity Simple Intermediate Complex
Typical specialization Commodity production in 
agriculture, light manufacturing, 
low value-added services
Advanced manufacturing, 
agri-business and services
Organization capital, coordination and 
research and development in complex 
agri-business, manufacturing and 
services, branding
Typical market structure 
and average firm size
Predominantly small firms Some large, missing middle size in 
the market likely
Complex market structure with several 
lead firms and conglomerates and a large 
and dynamic fringe of small to medium-
size firms that interact in complex ways
Buyer–seller relational 
dependence and 
governance in global 
value chains
Market relations (or captive, if 
supplier competence is low, 
transactions highly codified, and 
technological dependence high)
Relational or hierarchical Highly modular and complex vertical 
and horizontal relationships of 
interdependence
Typical firm structure 
and pool of skills
Few organizational layers, narrow 
set of capabilities, workforce 
distribution highly skewed toward 
production functions
Mid-complexity organization and 
firm structure
Large firm or conglomerate, 
quantitatively important middle and 
higher management and research and 
development staff relative to production 
functions
Mode of competition Price-to-quality competitiveness Increasingly diversified, nonprice 
competitiveness
Based purely on brand and value added 
features in highly specialized areas at the 
technology frontier
Source: Adapted from Mariscal and Taglioni 2017.
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firms tend to be medium to large, particularly in manufacturing 
(Cusolito and others 2016). Firm growth is driven by productivity 
and capabilities rather than by rent positions. And competition 
among firms is increasingly based on nonprice features, such 
as quality, customization, and responsiveness and timeliness in 
delivery.
Once countries reach high-income status, their firms’ engage-
ment in GVCs will likely be predominantly specialized in coor-
dination and high-value added services, such as research and 
development and branding. Firms are primarily buyers of inputs 
and components and sellers to end markets — or engaged in 
modular relationships. Their comparative advantage is based on 
offering highly specialized products at the technology frontier.
Institutions are central to these processes. Consider three key 
aspects. First, coordination among different levels of govern-
ments has to ensure that policies are not done and undone at dif-
ferent levels or that competition among regions does not erode 
the fiscal base. Coordination becomes increasingly important at 
higher levels of development. Second, predictability in policy 
implementation also matters proportionally with the level of 
development. Uncertainty could erode good current incentives 
by exposing firms to unnecessary risk. For example, uncertainty 
in trade openness policies may freeze the formation of buyer–
supplier links as firms find it optimal to wait before engaging in 
investments that lose all their value unless variable trade costs 
are actually reduced. Third, policies should be well sequenced. 
For example, opening to foreign direct investment without actu-
ally developing basic infrastructure and institutions is unlikely to 
generate much investment or many jobs. It may be beneficial to 
consider gradual increases in competition so that foreign firms 
do not eradicate all domestic firms and capture all economic 
rents. To put in place policies conducive to real domestic com-
petition is a sensible requirement before opening to trade or 
foreign direct investment. Another, more classic example is the 
coordination between foreign direct investment and trade pol-
icies. Since multinational corporations are import-intensive, 
opening to foreign direct investment to create jobs will not work 
unless foreign companies can also have access to the foreign 
services and intermediate goods they require.
There is no one way to optimally sequence policies, since 
considerations are context-specific. Yet some general regular-
ities in policies are likely to matter at different stages of GVC 
engagement and development (Taglioni and Winkler 2016). At 
the initial stages of GVC engagement, policies are best directed 
toward facilitating efficient use of resources and factors of pro-
duction and encouraging competition through broad market 
access (table 5.4). As development takes place and GVC engage-
ment deepens, the institutional setup should focus on helping 
firms thrive in a complex world — with both imports and exports 
from and to multiple countries and sourcing and selling to multi-
national corporations (domestic and foreign).
When a country reaches middle-income status, institutions 
can help leverage GVC engagement for development by foster-
ing skill building, innovation, and efficient access to capital; by 
including deep provisions in agreements with key trade partners; 
by supporting the engagement of more local firms and workers 
in the GVC network; and by focusing on structural reforms that 
raise domestic labor productivity and skills. As countries target 
high-income status, building institutions that allow for contracts 
to be more complete and for administrative burdens to be lower. 
They also need to ensure high confidence in the institutions, busi-
ness friendliness, and stable policies. Labor market– enhancing 
outcomes for workers at home and more equitable distributions 
of opportunities and outcomes create social support for a reform 
agenda aimed at strengthening a country’s GVC participation. 
Climate-smart policy prescriptions can mitigate the challenges for 
firms from climatic disruptions. Frederick’s (2016a, 2016b) work on 
the apparel GVC in China illustrates this dynamic (box 5.1).
Participating in global value chain trade in the context of a 
rapidly changing world of industrial production and work
The positive and significant relationship between GDP per capita 
and integration into GVCs raises questions about the gains of 
GVC trade for workers in countries at the middle-high income 
threshold. Over the past few years numerous reports and papers 
have investigated the impact of technological change on produc-
tion, trade, and labor markets (West 2015; Oxford Martin School 
2016; Chui and others 2016; WEF 2016; KPMG 2016; Autor 2015; 
TABLE 5.4 The institutional dimension of global value chain engagement
Low income Middle income High income
Global value chain 
engagement objective
Attract foreign direct investment 
and facilitate domestic firm entry 
into global value chains
Expand and strengthen participation 
in global value chains, including 
promoting economic upgrading and 
densification, and strengthening 
domestic firms’ absorptive capacity
Ensure sustainability and transform global 
value chain participation into inclusive growth
Institutional setup
Facilitate efficient use of resources 
and factors of production and 
encourage competition through 
broad market access
Foster skills-building and efficient 
access to capital and include deep 
provisions in agreements with key 
trade partners
Target contract completeness, lowering 
of administrative burden, high degree of 
confidence in institutions, business friendliness, 
stable policies, labor market–enhancing 
outcomes, and climate-smart policies
Source: Adapted from Taglioni and Winkler 2016.
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Beaudry and others 2016, Eden and Gaggi 2015; Morikawa 2016; 
Pikos and Thomsen 2016). Researchers have focused on the rapid 
technological advances in automation, big data analytics, and 
digitization. They have also looked at manufacturing responses 
to climate change and other environmental- and resource- 
related risks, including transitions toward additive manufacturing 
through three-dimensional printing technologies. And they see 
the growth of the circular economy as likely to require manufac-
turers to design products for several cycles of disassembly and 
reuse.
GVCs are characterized by four features: customized produc-
tion; sequential production decisions going from the buyer to the 
suppliers; high contracting costs; and global matching of goods, 
services, production teams, and ideas (Antràs 2015). All four point 
to the substantial power that multinational corporations coordi-
nating GVCs have in selecting where to geographically locate 
individual production tasks. Technological improvements are 
likely in each of these cases to increase both the sophistication of 
buyer demands and the supplier capabilities to meet them. A full 
exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
but given their implications for the relationship between GVC par-
ticipation and declining economic growth and structural stagna-
tion that many middle-income countries experienced, it is worth 
addressing two aspects of these medium-term developments.
First, the workforce skills required to manufacture even 
unsophisticated products is likely to increase substantially, requir-
ing not only higher levels of education but also cross-domain 
skills and tacit knowledge for using new equipment and think-
ing computationally and analytically and high levels of technical 
and engineering knowledge. For many middle-income countries 
this will require a fundamental upgrade of education systems, 
research institutions, and innovation systems. So the already 
diminishing advantage that labor-abundant, low-wage countries 
possess for low-skill manufacturing is likely to diminish further.
Second, re-shoring production to developed economies — 
given the need for highly skilled workers and, more important, 
the ability to automate many tasks — is likely to become even 
greater in coming years, reinforced by the rapidly growing polit-
ical backlash against globalization and rising economic nation-
alism in many western countries. Some 70% of clients surveyed 
in a recent study believe that automation and developments in 
three-dimensional printing will encourage companies to move 
their manufacturing closer to home, with North America seen as 
having the most to gain from this trend and China the most to 
lose (Oxford Martin School 2016). The jobs of 77% of workers in 
China and 69% of workers in India are at risk because of auto-
mation (World Bank 2016c). In this context the rapidly growing 
importance of trade in data and information, even within produc-
tion and manufacturing, is likely to further increase the modu-
larity of work processes and to bypass all but the most sophisti-
cated middle-income countries.
Together, these issues are likely to reinforce concerns of pre-
mature deindustrialization, with countries running out of industri-
alization opportunities sooner and at lower income than earlier 
BOX 5.1
Lessons from China for apparel upgrading
China has been remarkably successful in the apparel indus-
try, improving all key areas and growing rapidly. Fredrick 
(2016) argued that it was able to upgrade (process, product, 
end-market, function, and intersectoral) by having a dis-
tinct value proposition that entailed affordability, reliability, 
and the development of a good reputation; a broad range 
of product categories; full-package offerings; and “good-
enough” compliance. She attributes this to six factors:
• Industrial polices geared toward upgrading and assess-
ing global dynamics, including grants and loans for tech-
nological upgrading, incentives for machinery to make 
more advanced products while removing incentives for 
lower-value products; targeting of non-EU and non-U.S. 
markets as well as the domestic market; investments in 
textile capabilities and sustained technological invest-
ments and growth in key material segments; a “go-out” 
policy to encourage investment of low value-added seg-
ments in neighboring countries; and support for domes-
tic brand development.
• A functional division of labor between sales and produc-
tion, using agents and intermediates to promote manu-
facturers and link up with global buyers.
• Investments in connectivity through sourcing offices 
in Hong Kong, China, and near airports in mainland 
China that focused on having buyers both close and 
comfortable.
• Continuous innovation and modifications in production 
processes to keep costs low and keep up with emerging 
competitors.
• Developing long-term relationships that built on 
improvements in quality, speed, and price competition.
• Correctly assessing the tipping points for buyers possi-
bly inclined to change suppliers and not exceeding them.
While China’s success cannot be directly replicated, it 
does have numerous lessons for other countries, including 
the importance of developing long-term relationships and 
ties with foreign firms, partnering with Chinese firms both 
to transfer skills and knowledge and to access the Chinese 
market, targeting emerging markets without highly devel-
oped buyer–supplier relationships, targeting niches within 
a highly diversified industry, and taking advantage of rising 
labor costs in China to undercut these suppliers.
Source: Frederick 2016.
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industrializers (Rodrik 2016). The trend may have hit Latin Amer-
ican middle-income countries, both economically and in risks 
for political stability and democratization. Only recently have 
firms and governments in developed and developing economies 
come to terms with the fact that the GVC revolution required a 
fundamental rethinking of trade and, more broadly, industrial 
development. These new disruptive technological changes will 
again require new policies and strategies to adapt.
This points to the challenges for ensuring that the gains from 
GVC trade for industrializing countries actually benefit work-
ers and households — to the recent and emerging ever-more- 
complex aspects of the political economy of globalization, par-
ticularly for industrializing countries. What is needed? First is a 
better understanding of what automation is and what globaliza-
tion is — since narratives have profound political consequences. 
Second is a sharper focus on the distributional impacts of GVC 
trade, on adjustment costs, and on displacement — renewing 
attention to labor market impacts and to the risks of downgrad-
ing within GVCs for certain workers even as countries upgrade 
overall.
Conclusions and policy implications
Can integration into GVCs help countries avoid a middle-income 
trap? And if so, through what channels and under what circum-
stances? And how do the factors hypothesized to contribute 
to growth slowdowns at the middle-income level also impede 
economic upgrading through GVCs. Inevitably, in bridging two 
issues for which even definitions are heavily disputed, review-
ing the relevant theoretical literature and empirical analysis may 
have created more shadow than light.
In discussing the middle-income trap, it probably helps to 
move away from the deterministic framing that the concept can 
assume, particularly in the eyes of policymakers. The evidence 
is fairly robust that there is nothing overly probable, let alone 
inevitable, about growth slowdowns at specific incomes. But 
problems related to the structural transformation of industries 
are quite specific to middle-income countries, and this more lim-
ited understanding of a middle-income trap is analytically more 
tractable. The closely linked debates on GVCs and middle-in-
come traps both strongly point to developing countries’ need 
to adapt to a world of global trade and investment operating 
through globally integrated value chains in goods, services, and 
information. This presents a partial but important conceptual 
paradigm for addressing many middle-income countries’ inabil-
ity to converge with Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development economies. The macroeconomic, trade, and 
industrial policies required for successful GVC participation can 
play an important role in the factors that have contributed to eco-
nomic stagnation both in the recent past and in present-day mid-
dle-income countries. There is a reason why many countries find 
it difficult to graduate to high-income status: capabilities, poli-
cies, investment decisions, and institutional processes become 
highly complex. As economic forces interact in multidimensional, 
unpredictable, and dynamic ways, it is often difficult for institu-
tions to capture such complexity, adapt swiftly, and set policy 
priorities. Moreover, many challenges — and thus solutions — are 
unique to the respective country, sector, and commodity, so 
adopting previously successful strategies may not help. Indeed, 
emerging technological changes are likely to further complicate 
countries’ ability to integrate into and upgrade within GVCs.
Even so, policy recommendations can be formulated. First, 
policymakers and companies in the digital era — in developed and 
developing countries alike — will have to focus on the key features 
of the 21st century economy. This includes addressing the inter-
play between technological (digital) innovation and globalization 
(increased connectivity and GVCs) and creating an environment 
conducive to diversification, innovation, and productivity. Second, 
attention to the macroeconomic, social, and environmental sus-
tainability of a GVC-led development model is also in order.
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ANNEX 5.1
Attempts to quantify the middle-income trap
TABLE A5.1.1 Country status relative to indicators associated with middle-income trap
Country
Aiyar and others (2013)
“Trap Map” based on 
seven key factors
(higher score signifies greater 
risk of middle-income trap)
Felipe and others (2012)
LMIC trap = not crossed 
the lower-middle-income 
segment in at most 28 years
UMIC trap = not crossed 
the upper-middle-income 
segment in at most 14 years
Panther and Flechtner (2015)
Share of four total time periods 
(1976–2009) during which GDP 
per capita growth exceeded 
high-income country average
(%)
Albania LMIC trap 75
Algeria 13 LMIC trap 100
Argentina 12 100
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 12 LMIC trap 0
Botswana LMIC trap 75
Brazil 8 LMIC trap 75
Bulgaria 100
Cambodia 100
Chile 7 100
China 2 100
Colombia 6 LMIC trap 0
Congo, Rep. LMIC trap 75
Costa Rica 5 75
Czech Republic 100
Cyprus 75
Dominican Republic LMIC trap 75
Ecuador 9 LMIC trap 25
Egypt 8 LMIC trap 75
El Salvador 2 LMIC trap 50
Equatorial Guinea 50
Estonia 100
Gabon LMIC trap 25
Greece 75
Guatemala 11 LMIC trap 25
Honduras 11 50
Hong Kong, China 100
Hungary 100
India 4 100
Indonesia 1 100
Iran 4 LMIC trap 75
Ireland 75
(continued) 
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Country
Aiyar and others (2013)
“Trap Map” based on 
seven key factors
(higher score signifies greater 
risk of middle-income trap)
Felipe and others (2012)
LMIC trap = not crossed 
the lower-middle-income 
segment in at most 28 years
UMIC trap = not crossed 
the upper-middle-income 
segment in at most 14 years
Panther and Flechtner (2015)
Share of four total time periods 
(1976–2009) during which GDP 
per capita growth exceeded 
high-income country average
(%)
Jamaica LMIC trap 0
Jordan 11 LMIC trap 50
Korea, Rep. 100
Lebanon LMIC trap 100
Libya LMIC trap 50
Malaysia 5 UMIC trap 100
Mauritius 100
Mexico 6 50
Morocco 9 LMIC trap 100
Namibia LMIC trap 25
Nicaragua 50
Oman 100
Panama 13 LMIC trap 50
Paraguay 10 LMIC trap 25
Peru 12 LMIC trap 75
Philippines 10 LMIC trap 25
Poland 100
Portugal 50
Romania LMIC trap 75
Russian Federation 100
Saudi Arabia UMIC trap 25
Singapore 100
South Africa LMIC trap 25
Sri Lanka LMIC trap 75
Swaziland LMIC trap 50
Syria UMIC trap 100
Thailand 5 100
Tunisia 10 LMIC trap 75
Turkey 3
Ukraine 100
United Arab Emirates 50
Uruguay 8 UMIC trap 75
Venezuela, RB UMIC trap 100
Viet Nam 7 50
Yemen, Rep. LMIC trap 0
 
TABLE A5.1.1 Country status relative to indicators associated with middle-income trap (continued)
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Notes
1. Middle-income countries are defined by the World Bank as having a 
GDP per capita of $1,046–$12,735 in 2014. Countries with a higher 
GDP per capita are classified as high-income countries, and countries 
below $1,046 are classified as low-income countries. Upper-middle-in-
come countries have a GDP per capita of $4,126–$12,735, and low-
er-middle-income countries have a GDP per capita of $1,046–$4,125.
2. This dual interpretation of the middle-income trap is explained as fol-
lows. The first is that middle-income countries start growing slower 
than the average country conditional on their income; the second is 
that while it may be easy to become a middle-income country, it is 
difficult to move beyond it.
3. This is also central to much of the work linking complexity economics 
to economic development (Pugliese and others 2015). While address-
ing the literature’s perceived deficiencies on poverty traps and on 
processes of economic development more broadly, the researchers 
pointed particularly to the complexity of economic systems at the 
outset of industrialization, viewing this a dynamic process where com-
plex network- reinforcing production capabilities and product demand 
emerges. Using a new measure of complexity, they found that more- 
differentiated and more- complex economies face lower barriers (in 
GDP per capita) when starting the transition toward industrialization.
4. There have even been discussions of multilateral trade liberalization 
through specific value chains rather than through trade policy issues 
(the case thus far; Hoekman and Jackson 2013).
5. In broad strokes this mirrors the findings of the empirical literature of 
transmission channels for trade and foreign direct investment.
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